By resorting to 49-3, the government goes into force without playing … – The World

By resorting to 49-3, the government goes into force without playing … – The World

Le Monde | 17/02/2015 at 19:10 • Updated 02/17/2015 at 20:47 | By Thomas Wieder

There are two possible readings of the choice made by Manuel Valls, Tuesday, February 17, to use the weapon of order 49-3 to pass the bill of his Economy Minister, Emmanuel Macron. The first is the most obvious: it consists in seeing an admission of weakness on the part of the government

Read also:. Macron Law: Government forced to incur liability

Seek to 49-3, is to admit that a government has no majority to pass a bill. From this point of view, February 17, 2015 marks a turning point of the quinquennium. So far, the majority had balked, growled, kicked, but she had voted. Before the laws of finances and bills supplementary budget, calculators were warming up, the “rebellious” showing their muscles, the executive had cold sweats, but, ultimately, the texts were adopted.

François Holland, old patron of the Socialist Party Congress as much as in eternal optimist, does not necessarily also saw a dim view of those who were defecting in the majority. This allowed him to give the image of an open chair the debate, reluctant to any idea of ​​militarization at the same time it had the advantage, for those who did not bow to the group discipline, to be heard voice and exist both politically and media-

Read also the reactions. Use of 49-3, an “admission of weakness “

Undeniable snub

Now, the government can no longer afford such a luxury. The “rebellious” once feared little, are now taken seriously. For the executive, it is a sign of vulnerability that no one can dispute. This weakness is all the more clear that the government had prior to an asset that might suggest that the adoption of Macron bill would more easily than other texts in the past.

This asset was the general political climate of early this year, the famous “spirit of January 11,” which, for a few weeks seemed to silence the “rebellious”. In the post-attacks context, the government secretly hoped that the gravity of the situation would close ranks and internal wrangling for the majority, who were daily the first two years of the five-year period, would be nothing more than bad memories.

“The spirit of January 11,” any more than the considerable efforts made by Mr. Macron to convince MPs to vote its text will therefore have sufficed. One would think in fact that the dozens of hours of debate in committee and then in session past paring the text, would have ended up owing more reluctant or would have to build an alternative majority compensating defections left by supporters in the center and even the UMP. The proof is that it is not. The ability of the Minister and the rapporteurs of the text is nothing there either. For the executive, it is an undeniable snub.

In choosing the forced passage in the National Assembly, the government is there as long lasting politically weakened? Nothing is less certain. First, because, in the case of Macron law, the government has no opinion against him, on the contrary. According to a Odoxa-FTI Consulting survey to Les Echos and Radio Classique published late January, 61% of French have indeed voted the text if they had instead of parliament, and among them 58% of supporters left. For the government, the political costs of recourse to a 49-3 overall text approved by public opinion, particularly on the left is relatively limited. For the executive, parliamentary sling is acceptable as long as it is not accompanied by a popular revolt.

Earlier in the history of the V ^th Republic reminiscent: by resorting to 49-3, a government may not sign his death warrant. Raymond Barre, Prime Minister from 1976 to 1981, engaged liability eight times four texts; Pierre Mauroy, who succeeded him from 1981 to 1984, said the seven times on five different texts; Laurent Fabius, between 1984 and 1986, made the four times; Jacques Chirac, during cohabitation from 1986 to 1988, used meanwhile eight times 49-3.

However, the record holder in this area remains Michel Rocard who, when he was Prime Minister from 1988 to 1991 , y resorted 13 times. This did not prevent nor to govern, either to reform or to be popular. This is probably betting that done tonight Manuel Valls who, having been an advisor at Matignon with Michel Rocard, knows better than others how to lead the action of a government when it no longer benefits as of a relative majority in the National Assembly.